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This article examines the associational and societal foundations of structural power. A case study 
of the ten-year-long history of the Unión Portuaria de Chile is analysed with a focus on a critical 
juncture in 20122014. The Chilean dockworker case is an emblematic example of trade union 
movement revitalisation via strikes of strategically positioned workers. Yet ethnographic research 
with the organisation suggests that the role it has come to play in the country was only possible as 
a result of intensive long-term organising efforts to develop a high degree of internal unity at 
multiple scales, as well as sustained alliances with external actors. As a result, the authors argue that 
the most economistic accounts of worker power and trade union movement revitalisation are 
analytically insufficient and would benefit from greater attention to associational and societal 
dimensions of power, even among the most strategically positioned workers. 
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In October 2019, the most important social revolt in Chile since the return to democracy exploded 
onto the scene. Initiated by Santiago high school students in response to an increase in the cost of 
public transportation, the demands and geographical coverage of the revolt spread rapidly, the 
result of the countrys profound inequalities and institutional failings for all but the wealthy 
(Sehnbruch and Donoso, 2020). At the beginning, the countrys restrictive labour legislation meant 
that worker participation was spontaneous and not led by the unions. Soon, however, Chilean 
dockworkers took the initiative, stopping work in nearly all of the countrys ports and proposing a 
general strike. The Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), Chiles primary trade union 
confederation, had until that point declined to call for wider strike action in support of the social 
demands, but soon joined in as a result of the moral pressure exerted through the dockworkers 
strike (La Tercera, 2019) This led to the formation of a Strike Committee composed of the most 
important trade unions in the country. Through the Strike Committee, an agreement was reached 
that the strategic objective of the mobilisation should be the reform of the countrys constitution, 
inherited from the dictatorship, in addition to a range of specific demands.  
The leading role played by the dockworkers on the Chilean left since 2019 was made possible 
as a result of a successful series of national mobilisations carried out by the union in 20122014. 
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These mobilisations established the first stable precedent1 for de facto sectoral-level collective 
bargaining in the country since the 1970s, before the Pinochet dictatorship. That they did so 
through a national organisation lacking legal recognition, which had nevertheless carried out 
successful weeks-long strikes of the countrys ports in two consecutive years, only made it all the 
more extraordinary.  
Following their victory in 2014, as a result of coalitions formed during the strikes and the 
ascendance of the first right-wing government in the country since the end of the dictatorship, the 
Chilean dockworkers became heavily involved in a number of key political campaigns led by the 
left. These included movements to renationalise the pensions system, re-fund health and education, 
support workers in the education sector, and reform the system of labour law through direct action. 
The dockworkers participation in these movements was facilitated by the membership of many 
leaders and activists in the Izquierda Libertaria, a small but nationally organised left-wing political 
party. 
The Chilean dockworker case demonstrates the potential for the revitalisation of the trade 
union movement through leveraging the power of workers located in strategic chokepoints for 
global capitalism, as Silver (2003), Womack (2009, 2020), Moody (2017) and others have suggested. 
Yet, a close examination of the dockworkers success suggests the limits of the most economistic 
version of the strategic position trade union movement revitalisation thesis, which posits that 
industrial action at the point of production in strategic sectors by itself is sufficient. 
Instead, the Chilean dockworkers ability to make use of their structural power has been 
heavily conditioned by their ability to develop associational and societal power. First, dockworkers 
built a high degree of internal unity at multiple scales through long-term intensive organising 
efforts, establishing their associational power. This was necessary because earlier efforts to build 
strength in the sector had failed as dockworkers undermined one anothers struggles by continuing 
to work cargo during disputes, preventing them from effectively leveraging their supposed 
structural power. Second, in contrast to earlier failed efforts, dockworkers have relied to a 
surprising degree on societal power, formed through sustained alliances with external trade union 
and social movement allies to carry forward their work. In large part this has been the result of the 
extremely anti-union posture of employers, regularly backed up by repressive measures on the part 
of the state. Crucially, though perhaps counter-intuitively, the reiterative tendency towards heavy-
handed state intervention in the sector results directly from dockworkers strategic position in the 
economy and the potential for wide-ranging economic disruption that this implies. In other words, 
dockworkers paradoxically are vulnerable to repressive measures because of, rather than in spite of, their 
structural power. By forming alliances with external actors, the dockworkers have succeeded in 
developing a strong counter-hegemonic position, obligating the state to intervene in ways more 
favourable to labour.  
In this article, each of these conditions for success is considered in turn. The next section 
provides a review of the literature on trade union revitalisation from the perspective of Global 
Labour Studies and Chilean labour scholars, followed by an overview of the research design, and a 
presentation and discussion of findings. In the conclusion, the implications of these findings for 
the understanding of worker power and trade union strategy more generally are considered. 

1 In 2008, subcontracted miners at CODELCO, the state-owned copper company, succeeded in forcing the 
government to negotiate with them directly at the national level. Though this agreement covered a far larger 
number of workers than in the ports, the agreement only covered subcontracted workers in a single 
company. The port agreement, by contrast, was sectoral, in that it covered all workers in all companies in 
the countrys ports. Furthermore, the miners, unlike the dockworkers, were unable to compel their employer 
to respect the agreement over the long term. 
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Perspectives from the global labour literature 
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the possibility of trade union revitalisation 
through so-called strategic sectors of industry (Moody, 2017; Womack, 2020). Workers in 
logistics are often cited as the contemporary strategic workers par excellence as a result of their 
nodal position in the global circulation of commodities (Moody, 2017: 38). Scholars writing in the 
strategic power tradition ground their arguments in a highly economistic understanding of worker 
power. For example, Silver (2003) emphasises high sunk capital investments, the degree of 
complexity and integration of the labour process, and the contribution of an industry to domestic 
economic growth as key factors shaping worker power. In a similar vein, Womack (2009) 
emphasises the role of the technical relations of production  rather than the social relations of 
production  in structuring worker power. That is to say, workers occupy a strategic position if 
they are able to stop the production of many others, whether within the same plant or in the 
economy as a whole.  
Silvers (2003) framework develops two key concepts for understanding worker power, first 
introduced by Erik Olin Wright (2000). First is structural power, which accrues to workers simply 
by virtue of their position in the economic system, the state of labour markets and the nature of 
the labour process. Second is associational power, the power workers possess through their 
collective organisation in trade unions and political parties. Silvers operationalisation of these 
concepts suggests that these two fonts of power are not created equally, with structural power 
clearly taking precedence and associational power coming into play primarily as a means of 
bolstering workers when their structural power is weak.  
Womack (2020) likewise characterises associational power as a derivative power or mere 
consequence of structural power, which might matter at the margins or in particular situations but 
whose impact on struggles is far less determinative. Presumably, then, a high degree of structural 
power ought to lead more or less spontaneously to effective action. 
Dockworkers are presumed to have a high degree of structural power because of their ability 
to disrupt the flow of global commerce. Yet, while the theory described above suggests that they 
should therefore effectively exercise a high degree of power wherever they are found, the reality is 
far more complex. International research on dockworkers in Europe and Latin America (Fox-
Hodess, 2017, 2019) indicates that the ability of dockworkers to utilise the power available to them 
through their strategic position is in fact significantly conditioned by national socio-political 
contexts, particularly the willingness of states to repress trade unionists, compromised sovereignty, 
the character of port ownership (public or private), and aspects of labour law governing trade union 
organisation and industrial action. At the same time, historical research on dockworkers (Hamark, 
2013; Santibáñez, 2016, 2019; Cole, 2018) indicates that dockworkers are only able to exert power 
at the point of production when they have succeeded in controlling the labour supply. In other 
words, it is far from clear that dockworkers position in the economic system alone can provide a 
definitive account of their ability to effectively contest the imperatives of capital. 
At the same time, scholars writing in the Power Resources Approach (PRA) tradition (such as 
Schmalz, Ludwig and Webster, 2018) have attempted to systematise the growing number of power 
resources identified in the literature, moving beyond an economistic emphasis on structural power 
to consider other dimensions. While critics of the PRA have cautioned against its 
compartmentalised and non-relational approach to power (Gallas, 2018) as well as its problematic 
and unexamined political assumptions (Nowak, 2018), the PRAs typological definitions provide 
useful analytical frameworks. Of particular relevance to this article is the PRAs discussion of 
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associational power and societal power.  
Brookes (2018) argues that the definition of associational power provided by Wright (2000) 
and discussed above is imprecise because power implies power over someone or something but 
that person or thing is not specified. Brookes (2018: 256) therefore helpfully defines associational 
power as the ability of union leaders, shop stewards, labour activists or rank-and-file union 
members to compel the other members of their organisation to do something they otherwise would 
not do  in this case, to behave as a collective actor. Associational power may then be a 
precondition for magnifying the impact of the other power resources or, in some instances, a 
necessary condition for even exercising those power types in the first place (Brookes, 2018: 256). 
Societal power, conversely, is defined as the latitudes for action arising from viable cooperation 
contexts with other social groups and organisations.... The exercise of societal power is essentially 
a question of the ability to ... generalise the political project of the trade unions ... so that society as 
a whole adopts it as its own (Schmalz et al., 2018: 122). Societal power may then be used to 
compensate for a low degree of structural or associational power (Britwum, 2018).  
 
Perspectives from the Chilean literature 
Within the Chilean labour literature, there has been renewed interest in revitalisation of the trade 
union movement since 20072008, which saw an uptick in strike activity (Observatorio de Huelgas 
Laborales, 2017). Notably, this followed a period since the end of the 1990s that scholars 
characterise as a crisis of trade unionism. The crisis stemmed from the anti-union policies of the 
Pinochet dictatorship (Winn, 2004; Álvarez, 2017), and the subsequent defeat of trade unions in 
key sectors, as well as the increase in unemployment stemming from the shuttering or privatisation 
of key industries and the Asian economic crisis. The result was a drop in trade union membership 
and industrial action, as well as a drop in the number of political mobilisations called by the CUT 
(Ponce, 2018).  
The most important reference point in the Chilean scholarly literature following the 2007
2008 conjuncture was a book published by a group of historians and sociologists in 2009, 
suggestively titled The Rebirth of the Worker Strike in Chile (Aravena and Núñez, 2009), which focused 
on the surprising emergence of strikes in the previous years by subcontracted workers in the 
copper, forestry and salmon industries. The success of the worker struggles detailed in the edited 
volume, however, was not understood through the lens of strategic position. Nevertheless, the 
book was published soon after John Womacks (2009) celebrated book on worker power, which 
was widely read by Chilean labour scholars (Aguiar, 2009), and which contributed an understanding 
of the recent conflicts in terms of the disruptive capacity that these groups of workers possess as a 
result of the strategic position they occupy in the national economy (Aguiar, 2010; CIPSTRA, 
2013a, 2013b). On the other hand, empirical research on the Chilean dockworkers (Santibáñez and 
Gaudichaud, 2017) has identified associational factors as key to their success. This includes 
workers subjective understanding of the sources of their power, such as their strong occupational 
tradition, the importance of maintaining trade union unity and the ability to stay one step ahead of 
the bosses.  
Taken together, critical perspectives within both the global labour literature and the Chilean 
labour literature suggest that the strongly economistic orientation of dominant theories of worker 
power in strategic industries do not tell the full story. Instead, they imply that, as Brookes (2018: 
256) suggests, dimensions of worker power that might be considered associational (or societal) are 
in fact necessary preconditions for the exercise of structural power. That is to say, without the 
political space to manoeuvre within society  improved through the formation of external alliances 
 and without the ability to effectively unite in struggle, the supposed power of dockworkers at the 
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point of production is nowhere to be found. In this article, an iconic contemporary instance of 
effective dockworker power and strategy is examined over a ten-year period in terms of the extent 
to which effectiveness relied on strategic position, external alliances and their own internal 
organisational abilities. While the empirics speak directly to the Chilean experience, the findings 
have wide-ranging implications for the theorisation of worker power more generally. 
 
 
5HVHDUFK'HVLJQ
 
Background and case selection 
The Unión Portuaria de Chile is an exceptional case both within the Chilean trade union movement 
and within the world of global dockworker union activism. In Chile, the Unión Portuaria has come 
to be seen as a model of non-bureaucratic and assembly-based trade unionism capable of breaking 
the Pinochetista economic paradigm that has prevailed in post-dictatorship Chile through 
exercising power in a key strategic sector of the economy. However, the role that the dockworkers 
have come to play was far from certain and depended on their success in the 20122014 national 
strikes which reshaped the playing field for labourcapital conflicts in the sector. In other words, 
a role that has come to be seen as inevitable would, in fact, have been predicted by almost no one 
prior to this critical juncture.  
Until the coup détat which installed the 19731990 military dictatorship, the Chilean trade 
union movement was characterised by its militancy, radicalism and strongly class-based identity, as 
well as by the movements close ties with left-wing parties (Álvarez, 2017; Ponce, 2018). The 
Pinochet dictatorship radically reshaped the balance of class forces in Chile through brutal 
repression and intentional dismantling of worker power and organisations. Even more enduring, 
however, were neo-liberal reforms which institutionalised a new system of labour relations 
characterised by the weakening of workers collective bargaining power (Winn, 2004). The new 
system allowed employers to replace striking workers, restricted collective bargaining to the 
enterprise level, and promoted parallel unionism and the deregulation of the labour market. In 
addition, the shift away from Import Substitution Industrialisation, which had created a strong and 
heavily unionised industrial working class, to a strategy of exporting primary commodities, had a 
profoundly damaging effect on workers and the trade union movement beginning in the 1980s and 
lasting into the post-dictatorship period (Gárate, 2012; Ffrench-Davies, 2018). Union density never 
recovered its pre-dictatorship levels, holding steady at 1213 per cent of the workforce between 
1997 and 2008. Strike activity generally followed a similar pattern during the same period, while 
collective bargaining covered only 8 per cent of the workforce. The 20072008 strike wave was 
followed by a significant increase in strike activity from 20102015, primarily in the form of extra-
legal strikes (Observatorio de Huelgas Laborales, 2017; Pérez, Medel and Velásquez, 2017). 
Nevertheless, 65 per cent of the unions formed in 2014 had disappeared by 2016, and half of those 
remaining had forty or fewer workers, while 80 per cent of companies in the country had never 
been unionised (Doniez, 2019).  
Although some subcontracted export industry workers, such as copper miners, had begun to 
mobilise soon after the return to democracy, the real growth of organising only began ten years 
later, with dockworkers strikes between 1999 and 2003 and the strikes of forestry workers, copper 
workers and fishery workers between 2007 and 2008 noted above (Aravena and Núñez, 2009). All 
of these conflicts received a great deal of public attention, given their centrality to the countrys 
economy, their militancy and police repression (Aravena, 2017). For all these reasons, although 
workers in other sectors such as health and education had tended to be more permanently 
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mobilised (Ponce, 2018), this grouping of conflicts in primary export sectors has widely been 
considered the central axis of Chilean trade union movement revitalisation, both by researchers 
and in public discourse. 
At the same time, among dockworker union activists internationally, the Chilean case is seen 
as a model of what is possible when militant industrial action at the point of production is backed 
up by cross-border solidarity. Affiliates of the Unión Portuaria today are members of the 
International Dockworkers Council (IDC), an independent global union organisation formed in 
2000 (Fox-Hodess, 2020). The Chilean dockworkers disputes in 20122013 and 20132014 came 
in the midst of a period of rapid expansion for the IDC in Latin America. This provided an 
opportunity for the organisation to demonstrate its value to both the Chilean dockworkers, at a 
time when only a small number of local branches in the country were affiliated to the IDC, and to 
dockworkers across Latin America more generally. The IDCs support, via a threatened 
international blockade of cargo, played a significant role in breaking the impasse in bargaining, and 
the Chilean dockworkers struggle overall has come to be viewed as a major victory and reference 
point for the global movement, most especially within Latin America. 
 
Methodology  
The authors carried out multi-method qualitative research between 2010 and 2020, including 
interviews, participant observation, and analysis of union archival documents and relevant news 
items. Fieldwork was carried out in eleven ports  Arica, Iquique, Mejillones, Antofagasta and 
Huasco in Northern Chile; San Antonio and Valparaíso in Central Chile; and Talcahuano, San 
Vicente, Coronel and Puerto Montt in Southern Chile  as well as in Santiago, the inland capital 
city. Fox-Hodess, a labour sociologist, conducted in-country interview-based research in early 2015 
and 2019 with dockworker unionists active in the Chilean port cities of Talcahuano (6), Valparaíso 
(5), San Antonio (2), Mejillones (1), Antofagasta (1) and Iquique (6). In addition, she attended 
meetings of the International Dockworkers Council with Chilean dockworker union leaders in 
Tenerife (Spain) in 2014, Miami (United States) in 2016, London (England) in 2018, and Lisbon 
(Portugal) in 2019. Additional interviews conducted with IDC-affiliated dockworker union activists 
from Argentina (1), Uruguay (1), France (2) and Spain (3) in 2014 and 2015 contributed further to 
the analysis of the role of international solidarity in the Chilean disputes. 
Santibáñez Rebolledo, a labour historian, carried out participant observation with the Unión 
Portuaria over the past decade, participating in national congresses (5), strikes (10) and national 
union meetings (10). He has also conducted historical research on the twentieth-century history of 
the Chilean dockworkers using trade union archives and local press reports. In addition, he has 
long-standing linkages with the union as a socially engaged scholar, contributing to the preparation 
of working papers and Trade Union Schools analysing the recent conflicts, as well as delivering 
technical documents to support the union in its tripartite negotiations with the employers and 
government. 
 
 
$VVRFLDWLRQDO3UHFRQGLWLRQVRI6WUXFWXUDO3RZHU8QLW\RIWKH:RUNIRUFH
Theories of structural power (Silver, 2003) and strategic position (Womack, 2009) suggest that 
dockworkers position in the economic system and the technical relations of production in the 
industry should predict effective industrial action in the sector. Yet, research into the ten-year 
history of the Unión Portuaria de Chile tells a far more complex story in which the associational 
dimension of worker power  that is, the ability to behave as a disciplined collective actor 
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(Brookes, 2018: 256)  is a contingently available precondition for the effective exercise of power 
at the point of production. 
The highly atomised system of industrial relations put in place during the dictatorship and 
carried forward into the present  which mandates collective bargaining at the enterprise (rather 
than sectoral) level, parallel unionism, and the separation of collective agreements for permanent 
and casual workers (Julián, 2020)  has posed significant challenges to activists seeking to build the 
kind of unity necessary to behave as a collective actor. Chilean dockworkers have responded over 
time by building from the bottom up, gradually increasing their unity and capacity to make and 
implement strategic decisions at the point of production and, as discussed in the following section, 
in society at large. 
 
Unity at the local level 
Following the return to democracy in the early 1990s, multiple local-level trade unions competed 
with one another for members among each employer in every port, and problems of corruption 
and paternalism among union officials were endemic. The result was low levels of trust, cohesion 
and organisational commitment among the membership. These factors constrained dockworkers 
ability to act as an effective collective actor to improve their working conditions, as union leaders 
signed sweetheart deals with management and competed for work across the sector, fostering a 
race to the bottom. 
As Sergio Parra, a union leader from the Port of Talcahuano-San Vicente put it: 
 
In the old days  there were lots of unions, just like there were lots of companies as well. Each 
company had its group of people, tiny unions, without greater weight in bargaining (Interview, S. 
Parra, San Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015).  
 
In addition, there were strong divides across the sector between permanent and casual workers and 
in some ports, like Iquique, between workers in the public and private terminals of the port. 
Corruption and paternalism created further problems. As Joan Parra, a leader from the FETRAPI 
union federation in the northern Port of Iquique, put it: 
 
The work that there was, was managed by a group of leaders  that controlled  the hiring system. 
And they chose who participated by pointing a finger, according to their participation, according to 
their cooperation, and many times, according to the money that was given  in order to be able to 
work (Interview, J. Parra, Iquique, 2015).  
 
José Agurto, from San Vicente-Talcahuano, highlighted another facet of corruption:  
 
This is a world of temptation, the dockworker world, above all for the leaders  its never lacking 
the boss that says to you, Dont worry, Ill help you and afterwards, at the bargaining table, he says 
to you, Ah, remember that I helped you (Interview, J. Agurto, San Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015).  
 
Dockworkers worked to address these issues over time by electing new union leadership and 
holding them accountable. They also sought to unite dockworkers on permanent and casual 
contracts who, by law, are organised into separate unions. The fact that workers in both categories 
earn similar salaries, as well as the strength of the casual worker unions thanks to their control of 
the hiring hall, created a firm basis for cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperation was not a foregone 
conclusion, and depended on the initiative and creativity of union activists who got around 
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restrictive legal provisions by forming de facto trade union organisations uniting both groups of 
workers through the regional UPCh structures. 
 
Unity at the regional level 
Regional unity was a clear strategic necessity because of the ease with which employers can divert 
cargo to nearby ports during disputes, or hold down wages and working conditions over the long 
term by forcing nearby port workforces to compete with one another. The first region to unite 
successfully was the southern Biobío region where there was a particular necessity for unity given 
the fact that there are several competing ports within close proximity to one another. As José 
Agurto put it: 
 
We took the risk to speak with the ports of Lirquén and Coronel and we said to them, why dont we 
make a single regional pay scale   there were big differences in pay between Lirquén, San Vicente 
and Coronel  We had a regional work stoppage that lasted five days and the solutions were given 
immediately, so we saw that it was the best that we could have done (Interview, J. Agurto, San 
Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015). 
 
In the subsequent negotiations in 2005, bargaining occurred not only at the regional level in the 
Biobío, rather than at the local level, but with the political authority of the region, rather than the 
port employers, setting an important precedent. 
In the north, ports are spaced apart at a greater distance, yet the need for regional coordination 
remains in order to prevent shipping companies from diverting cargo to other ports during labour 
disputes, undercutting dockworkers structural power. Alejandro Lilis, a leader from the Port of 
Antofagasta, explained: 
 
At some moment in collective bargaining, the ships from Antofagasta went towards Iquique and the 
next year the same thing was happening; the ones from Iquique were going to Antofagasta, and they 
were worked. After, a conversation began about not doing this anymore We made the linkages, 
the ties, and today we dont have problems (Interview, A. Lilis, Antofagasta, 2015). 
 
For the same reason, the crushing of the union in Mejillones after the 2014 strike, described below, 
posed a significant problem for the other unions in the north. As Nelson Francino from the Port 
of Iquique put it:  
 
Now with Mejillones, Iquique has to really think about if it stops work. In some way, our hands are 
tied because Mejillones doesnt stop work (Interview, N. Francino, Iquique, 2015).  
 
On the other hand, recent success in early 2019 to reform the notoriously employer-friendly 
Sindicato No. 1 in the Port of Valparaiso has yielded positive results for the Unión Portuaria in the 
central region of the country. This has opened the possibility for stronger cooperation between 
dockworkers in the countrys two largest container ports, Valparaiso and San Antonio, whose 
workforces have long been used to undermine one other during disputes (Interview, M. 
Montecinos, Valparaiso, 2019). 
 
Unity at the national level 
While the need for unity at the local and regional level primarily stems from the improved capacity 
to engage in effective industrial action, the need for unity at the national level stems as well from a 
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very different set of issues related to the role of the state in constituting labourcapital relations. 
In forming the Unión Portuaria de Chile (UPCh), Chilean dockworker leaders understood that 
bringing about sector-wide change would require sector-wide mobilisation at the national level. 
The strategy was straightforward: employers would do everything possible to resist worker 
demands, so the dockworkers would need to threaten the conditions of accumulation of capital in 
general in order to compel the state to resolve disputes in their favour. Doing so would require 
carefully coordinated strikes that not only affected capital in the shipping industry but capital in 
key export industries (such as agriculture and mining, the latter of which is partially state-owned), 
as well as the import of retail goods.  
Prior to the formation of the Unión Portuaria, Chilean dockworkers had learned important 
lessons from the failed experiment of the Coordinadora de Trabajadores Marítimo-Portuarios 
(19992004) which had emerged in response to the concessioning of Chiles ports, organising their 
fight port by port. The UPCh, founded in 2012, began instead by pressing a national demand for 
the state to refund a tax that dockworkers had been wrongly charged for years. Through illegal 
strikes involving dozens of ports, they won. Additional early success on the payment of lifetime 
pensions, which are inheritable and equivalent to twice the minimum wage, as well as the 
establishment of joint committees on health and safety in the stevedoring firms, demonstrated to 
the workers that their strength resided in disciplined collective action, and established practices for 
future mobilisations.  
The UPCh incorporated key organisational features of the Unión Portuaria del Biobío 
(UPBB). This included a structure of direct democracy and a lack of bureaucratisation, depending 
upon unpaid spokespeople elected on a yearly basis from among base-level leaders, rather than an 
executive board (Interview, J. Agurto, San Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015). Declining to form a legally 
recognised union organisation has allowed the UPCh to find ways to creatively skirt around 
restrictive provisions of the law. Frequent contact among spokespeople from the zones, as well as 
in-person meetings, have enabled the organisation to flourish. In addition, the UPCh, like the 
UPBB, has from its inception played an important role in wider mobilisations in support of broad 
working-class demands. 
At the same time, however, the dockworkers learned difficult lessons about the importance 
of unity as a precondition for effectively exercising structural power. In December 2013, a group 
of workers from the Port of Mejillones tried to force a local port employer to engage in collective 
bargaining to reach an agreement covering both casual and permanent workers. The company 
refused and the workers began a strike without the support of the rest of the local trade unions in 
the port. The state brought in a massive show of police force to ensure the smooth flow of goods 
through this critical chokepoint. Despite receiving the support of the national Unión Portuaria, 
without local level unity they were unable to prevent the port from continuing to operate and the 
local demand failed.  
At the national level, however, the dispute widened and came to focus on a demand put 
forward in a second strike, initiated two days later in San Antonio, the largest port in the country. 
This demand was national: backpay for the lunch breaks that they had not been allowed for years. 
In contrast to Mejillones, local-level unity at San Antonio ensured that the port was unable to 
continue to operate normally, despite a large show of force by the police. When the state conceded 
to the demand on backpay after a month of national strike action, the Unión Portuaria decided to 
end the strike and accept the agreement. As a result, Mejillones was essentially left in the lurch and 
the national union lost this strategic northern port.  
San Antonios strategic position as the primary supplier to the capital city, Santiago, located 
inland in the same region, in addition to its role as an exporter of perishable goods that make up a 
  
Global Labour Journal, 2020, 11(3), Page 231 
significant proportion of the countrys export revenue, enabled it to play a critically important role 
in the strike. Timing the strike during the southern hemisphere fresh fruit and vegetable harvest 
put significant pressure on government to intervene via pressure from employers associations in 
the agricultural export sector. As a leader from San Antonio put it:  
 
When this thing  was going to be resolved is exclusively when 5 000 pigs are going to die  a 
million chickens are going to die, the clinics dont have medicines, the guys dont have spare parts, 
the fruit was fucked, the truck drivers werent moving [cargo]  the business owners  said to the 
government, fix this thing (Interview, San Antonio, 2015).  
 
However, a purely economic reading would be insufficient to understand why, one year later, 
the UPCh found itself in a weakened position as a result of the loss of Mejillones, as explained 
above. In addition, in the course of a few months following the strike, the employers succeeded in 
breaking the federation that had united the local San Antonio unions by offering permanent 
contracts to a large number of casual workers, taking away the power of the union-controlled hiring 
hall and expelling a union leader from the port. The state declined to get involved, suggesting that 
it was an issue for the workers to resolve among themselves.  
In other words, the states role in structuring worker power in the disputes proved to be a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, dockworkers associational power, and the use of structural 
power that it enabled, succeeded in compelling the state to resolve the dispute in the workers 
favour. But the states role in constituting a highly unequal balance of class forces remains as ever 
contradictory, evidenced by the use of repressive measures and unfriendly provisions in the law to 
undermine associational power  and with it, the possibility of effectively exercising structural 
power  in key ports in the future.  
 
Unity at the global level 
At the time of the national strikes in 20122013 and 20132014, only a small number of local 
unions in the north were affiliated to the International Dockworkers Council.2 Nevertheless, the 
IDC played an important role in ending the dispute in the dockworkers favour in 2014 by 
threatening an international blockade of Chilean cargo at a key moment in the dispute, increasing 
pressure on the state to settle the dispute. Dockworkers from competitor yellow unions 
COTRAPORCHI and COMACH had continued to work the cargo in the small number of ports 
that were not affiliated to the Unión Portuaria  and in some cases, had served as strike-breakers 
in Unión Portuaria affiliated ports. The threat of a blockade, therefore, was to some extent able to 
redress the undercutting of the UPChs structural power that the lack of total unity at the national 
level had enabled. 
In addition to the economic leverage this provided in negotiations, the threat of an 
international blockade by a European-based organisation  which garnered national headlines in a 
context in which the Chilean unions had struggled to attract the attention of the media  was one 
more factor putting pressure on the Chilean government from a public relations perspective (see 
next section). An activist from Iquique argued that the Chilean state, which sells abroad an image 
of being super stable, is particularly sensitive to negative perceptions internationally so when it 

2 Currently, local unions from nine of the twenty-four ports with affiliation to the Unión Portuaria are 
affiliated to the IDC. These nine ports are: Antofagasta, Caldera, Chañaral, Huasco, Iquique, Lirquen, San 
Antonio, San Vicente, Ventanas.
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is seen from abroad that in Chile, no, things are not all right, there is a concern on the part of the 
state. In fact, it was resolved by that government (Interview, Iquique, 2015).  
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Societal power has also played a crucial role in increasing the impact of dockworkers structural 
power and in ensuring that its exercise is not undone by the state. Developing tactical alliances with 
other workers (from productive sectors of the economy and with dockworkers internationally) 
and political alliances with other social groupings (in particular, students and university 
professionals) played a critical role in magnifying dockworkers collective voice in a context in 
which they struggled to be heard. This increased the pressure on the state to resolve the dispute in 
their favour. Over the long term, these external alliances have coalesced into effective coalitions to 
defeat anti-union legislation (in 2015), to overturn the privatised pensions system instituted during 
the Pinochet era and, most recently (in the 20192020 wave of protests), to put forward a raft of 
social demands, coupled with the demand for constituent assemblies. 
 
Alliances with students 
Perhaps the most surprising facet of the Chilean dockworkers societal power has been their 
connection to university students in port cities across the country. Leaders from the Biobío region 
in the south, the Port of San Antonio in the centre, and the ports of Antofagasta and Iquique in 
the north all identified local university students as their most important source of external support. 
A leader from San Antonio explained that, in a context in which the dockworkers had struggled to 
be heard,  
 
[the students] brought it to the public light and there we achieved press attention  and also the 
students brought us communications from Spain, from France, from Germany (Interview, San 
Antonio, 2015).  
 
Nelson Francino from the Port of Iquique concurred:  
 
There wasnt much support [from the rest of society], but what was felt strongly was the support of 
the student comrades, in every respect. They were also there in our headquarters, when it was 
necessary to go out and paint murals. They were there when it was necessary to take to the streets 
(Interview, N. Francino, Iquique, 2015). 
 
The students supported the dockworkers struggle at the national level as well, and from the 
very beginning this support was mutual. At the national congress of the Unión Portuaria in 2013, 
university students from the CONFECH federation made a presentation asking the dockworkers 
for their support in the on-going student mobilisations that had reached their peak in Chile in 2011 
(Interview, N. Francino, Iquique, 2015)  at that time, the most significant protest movement in 
the country since the return to democracy. The dockworkers subsequently carried out a work 
stoppage on 24 July 2013 in support of a national student strike. The students were ready to return 
the favour when the first national dockworker strike began at the end of the year: 
 
The [student] federation contributed tickets so that some union leaders could travel.  in some cases 
the same secretaries of the federation took notes [for us]. They were included in what were the debates 
within the Unión Portuaria. Here in Iquique we had the comrades, there were several, that were 
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always present, in every action, in all the mobilisations  in fact there are still students who have 
gotten close to the ports and are working [there] (Interview, N. Francino, Iquique, 2015). 
 
Facilitated in part through the participation of many union leaders in the Izquierda Libertaria 
political party, university-trained professionals (economists, historians, attorneys) played an 
important role as well by providing on-going advice, often in an unpaid capacity, on strategy and 
in educating the membership. 
 
Alliances and antagonism with other workers  
Building societal power, whether with trade unionists in other sectors or workers in the community 
at large, played an important role, both in increasing pressure on government (through the 
possibility of solidarity strikes) and mitigating the perception that the dockworkers strike was 
damaging to workers in other sectors, which might otherwise have provided a pretext for more 
severe government repression. A leader from San Antonio shared:  
 
The number of guys that were out of work in this country because of the fruit [not being shipped] 
was enormous  (Interview, San Antonio, 2015).  
 
As a result, a leader from Iquique suggested:  
 
They criminalised us in the media (Interview, San Antonio, 2015).  
 
José Agurto argued that as a consequence:  
 
When we make decisions, we make them responsibly. We dont go on strike for stupid things  the 
whole citizenry would pile on us  (Interview, J. Agurto, San Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015). 
 
Support from other unionised groups of workers came from various quarters, particularly the 
mines and the fields. Copper miners in the north provided moral support to the dockworkers in 
Antofagasta (Interview, A. Lilis, Iquique, 2015), while copper miners at the massive El Teniente 
mine in the centre of the country held a work stoppage in solidarity (Interview, S. Vargas, San 
Antonio, 2015). Vargas suggested that the work stoppage at El Teniente had hurried along the 
end of the strike because when it happened  
 
the [government] minister Jobet calls me  and he said to me you are an anti-patriot, the country 
is going to stop growing, the whole country is going to come for you because the economy was being 
tremendously harmed and I saw the despair of the government to resolve the issue (Interview, S. 
Vargas, San Antonio, 2015). 
 
Support from the leadership of the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), which 
represents many farmworkers in Chile, was particularly significant given the agricultural losses 
sustained as a result of the strike (Interview, union leader, San Vicente-Talcahuano, 2015): 
 
[The union] was lending us their headquarters  in Santiago so we could have meetings there when 
we were going out to the meetings with the government.  he even gave us food, he directed the 
logistics in Santiago  they contributed economic resources so that we could maintain ourselves 
because the government doesnt even give you a glass of water (Interview, S. Vargas, San Antonio, 
2015) 
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Beyond organised groups of workers, the dockworkers sought support from the broader 
community in port cities. Nelson Francino, from Iquique, explained that they had built support 
through 
 
popular radios that counter the information from the press  information from hand to hand, 
doing activities. For example, here in Iquique we made a free clinic, in which the comrades that were 
leaving the university as doctors came and gave medical appointments we made cultural activities 
 to have a little music outdoors and take advantage of the platform that a stage gives to speak to 
the citizenry and say that the mobilisation was of a peaceful character and what we were wanting was 
a just demand for the workers. Those were the techniques to combat a little the bad propaganda that 
the press made against us constantly during the mobilisations (Interview, N. Francino, Iquique 2015). 
   
This suggests that while the dockworkers strategic position in the economy provided them with a 
tremendous amount of potential structural power because of the wide-ranging economic impacts 
of port strikes, the fact that the economic impacts are so wide-ranging, impacting labour as well as 
capital, can simultaneously undermine their struggle from the perspective of building a hegemonic 
position in the eyes of the society. In other words, the strongest position from an economic 
perspective (strategic position) can simultaneously be the weakest position from a social or political 
perspective. In this regard, then, societal power provided a form of counter-hegemonic pressure 
on the state, as well as a buffer against state repression that, when coupled with the economic 
pressure of coordinated industrial action, proved decisive. 
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Dockworkers have played a central role in the revitalisation of the Chilean trade union movement 
in recent years, thanks to their ability to successfully confront both private employers and the state. 
From 2012 to 2014, through disciplined and strategic collective action, based at different scales of 
organisation and unified around core demands, they achieved a stunning victory, establishing a 
precedent for sectoral-level collective bargaining for the first time since the Allende era. This 
outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion but instead depended entirely on the 
dockworkers success in developing their associational and societal power. Without these, their 
structural power would have existed purely as a theoretical abstraction  a reality that seems to be 
as clear to employers and the state as it is to the trade unions in the sector. As a result, it might be 
said that it is the associational and societal sphere in which class conflict actually plays out.  
The leading role that the dockworkers play in the current period of social protest in Chile, 
therefore, is no mere reflection of the place that these workers occupy in the export-driven 
economy but of conscious decisions to play a strategic role in broader political movements. 
Following the successful strikes of 20122014, despite their diminished capacity, the Unión 
Portuaria played a leading role in the national worker struggle in 2015 to reform the countrys 
labour legislation, inherited from the dictatorship. In addition, the union maintained its 
participation in the mobilisations against the privatised pensions system and sustained its close 
relationship with other mobilised social actors, particularly students and teachers. In forming 
alliances with external actors, the dockworkers have been able to achieve a powerful counter-
hegemonic position that strengthens their ability to compel the state to accede to their demands. 
That is to say, the involvement of the dockworkers in issues that tie them to the working class in 
general reinforces their own negotiating position at the point of production, which, in turn, allows 
them to fight for improved conditions beyond the point of production for the working class more 
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broadly. In the context of post-dictatorship Chile, this constitutes an important strategic innovation 
of great relevance to the working class and the left, whose progress has been impeded again and 
again by the legacy of the dictatorship. 
Furthermore, the implications of this case serve to complicate overly economistic analyses of 
worker power, suggesting that researchers would do well to not assume the power of workers on 
the basis of strategic position alone but instead to consider the organisational preconditions that 
allow them to make use of their strategic position. While proponents of the strategic position 
revitalisation thesis ground their arguments in the materiality of production and circulation (Silver, 
2003; Womack, 2009, 2020; Moody, 2017), the Chilean case demonstrates that greater potential 
power in the economic domain creates significant vulnerabilities for workers in the political and 
social domains which can only be countered by the exercise of strategic agency on the part of the 
workers involved. Far from derivative powers emerging as a consequence of structural power 
(Womack, 2020), associational and societal power are instead fundamental conditions of class 
organisation that make the effective exercise of structural power possible. 
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